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PROFIT SHARING k N D A WAGE
EARNERS* INVESTMENT FUND
Hans Brems
*
University of Illinois at Urb&na"-Champaign
To a wage earners* investment fund let all employers contribute
compulsorily a fraction of their profits bill. To the employees the
fund issues nonnegotiable fund certificates, redeemable after a
specified number of years. Within the framework of a simple neoclass-
ical model of steady—state inflation and growth, the article determ-
ines the size of such a fund as well as its effects upon the marginal
productivity of capital, disposable-income distribution between
capital and labor, the propensity to save national output, and the
real wage rate. Profit sharing is briefly compared with an investment
fund to which all employers contribute compulsorily a fraction of
their wag e bill.
I. THE SCHEME
Unlike American labor unions, Western European ones are used
to influencing national economic policy by working with the
government, Barbash [lj. A recent example of such collaboration
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is the emergence in Western Europe of the Idea of a wage earners*
investment fund financed by profit sharing.
Serving the dual purpose of giving labor a share of, first, the
capital gains accruing to stockholders in an inflationary economy
and, second, the co-determination rights inherent in stock ownership,
& wage earners' investment fund would work as follows. Primarily
in the form of corporate stock all employers would contribute
compulsorily a fraction of their profits bill to the fund. The fund
would belong to the employees. To the individual employees, in
turn, the fund would issue nonnegotiable fund certificates. A
specified number of years after its issue a fund certificate would
Wo
«5ome redeemable in cash at a price which would include the share
of that certificate in all capital gains and dividends made by the
fund during the lifetime of the certificate. The fund would b©
allowed to sell contributed corporate stock at any time and buy
other stock.
The purpose of the present article Is to examine the macroeconotaic
effects of such a fund, 1. e., the effects upon the marginal productivity
of capital, disposable-income distributions, the pro-
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penalty to save national output t and the real wage rate.
What would be a suitable theoretical framework for our analysis?
From the purposes of the fund it follows that our model should be
capable of accommodating inflation and that its capitalists should
be stockholders rather than bondholders. We choose the simplest
possible one-sector neoclassical model of steady-state inflation end
growth. Its capitalists are capitalist-entrepreneurs producing a
single good from labor and an immortal capital stock of that good*
hence investment is the act of setting aside part of output for
installation as capital stock. Capital stock is the result of
accumulated savings——voluntary as well as forced. Technology,
available labor force, and the money wage rate are growing autonom-
ously.
II, NOTATION
Variables
c 5 propensity to consume national output
C = consumption
$ 5 si2e of wage earners* investment fund relative to capital stock
= absolute size of wage earners* investment fund
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g 2 proportionate rate of growth of variable v 2 c, C, 4, I, l,
K, L, P, S, 6, X, Y1$ Y 2 , Y, and 2
Z s investment
I S internal rate of return
k 2 present gross worth of a physical unit of capital stock
K 2 physical marginal productivity of capital stock
L S labor employed
v s propensity to save national output
P S price of good
r 3 discount rate applied by capitalist-entrepreneurs
8 2 physical capital stock
6 5 disposable-income to output ratio, called "the payout ratio"
M 3 wage bill
X 3 physical output
T 3 disposable money income
Z 2 profits bill including employers* contribution to fund per year
Parameters
o, 3 2 exponents of production function
b 2 employers' contribution to fund as a fraction of profits bill
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c, s propensity to consume national disposable real income
e S Euler*s number, the base of natural logarithms
F = available labor force
g S proportionate rate of growth of parameter p 5 F, M» and if
M S multiplicative factor of production function
p = redemption period
w 2 money wage rate
Parameters listed are stationary except F, M, and w, whose growth
rates g_, gM , and g are stationary. Time coordinates are t and T.
The unit of time is the year.
III. IBB EQUATIONS OF THE MODEL
1. Definitions
Fifteen variable growth rates are listed in Sec. XI. To all apply
the definition
dv 1
(1) through (15) g 5 —- -
v dt v
Define Investment as the derivative of capital stock with
respect to time:
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(16) I £ dS/dt
2. Production
Let capitalist-entrepreneurs apply the production function
(17) X = MLaS B
where < a < 1; < < 1; a + - 1; and M > 0. Let profit
maximization under pure competition equalize real wage rate and physical
marginal productivity of labor:
w 3X X
(18) - * — a a -
P 9L L
Physical marginal productivity of capital is defined:
3X X
(19) K H — = -
as s
Multiply (19) by price of output P to find value marginal
productivity of capital. Define money profits earned on each physical
unit of capital stock S as its value marginal productivity. Then multiply
by S to find money profits earned on entire capital stock
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(20) Z = KPS - $PX
Under full employment available labor force equals labor
employed:
(21) F - L
Define wage bill as money wage rate times employment:
(22) W £ wL
3. Absolute Size of Fund
At time t, let the employers contribute the amount bZ(t) to the wage
earners' investment fund. Let bZ(.T, t) be the value at time T of the
amount bZ(t) contributed at time t. Hpw does bZ(t) grow to become bZ(T,t)?
Assume wage earners to have the same motivation and skill as capitalist
-entrepreneurs hence, like the latter, to be making the internal rate of

return \ on the money value of the capital stock they own, i. e.
the wage earners" investment fund. Let the earnings of the fund
be compounded continuously, then
V(T - t)
(23) &Z(T, t) - e bZ(t)
Let all wage earners present their fund certificates for
redemption as soon as the latter become redeemable. Redemption
at time t is the accumulated value at time T of the contribution
made at time t - p, where p is the redemption period. The size
of the fund at time t is the value at time T of all contribution]
made from tsT-ptot=T:
(2A) *(T) S /*
_
bZ(T, t)dt
The profits bill out of which, the contributions to the fund are
made, is growing at the proportionate rate g_, hence
g z (T - t)(25) Z(t) - e Z Z(t)
Insert (23) and (25) into (24) and find the size of the fund
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. (l - gz )(T - t)
(26) *(T) » /.[ _ e * bZ(T)dt
The integration would be facilitated by assuming the internal
rate of return 1 and the proportionate rate of growth of the
profits bill g_ to be stationary:
(27) di/dt -
(28) dg
z
/dt «
The integration will have to be carried out separately for
I j* g„ and i = g,. Find all variables in the outcome referring to
the same time t, purge it of T, <*nd write the size of the fund
O - 8 7 )P
(29) * - bZ[e L - l]/(i - gz ) for l j* gz
* bZp for l g z
4» Disposable-Income Distribution between Labor and Capital
Redemption at time T is the accumulated value at time T of the
contribution made at time T - p. That value we write bZ(x, T - p)
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and define labor's disposable income at time T as tbe wage bill
plus redemption at tbat time:
Y^T) = W(T) + bZ(T, T - p)
Insert (25) into (23), replace t by T - p, and find redemption
(1 - gz )PbZ(T, t - p) - e bZ(T)
Use this, (18), (20), and (22) to write labor's disposable income
(30) Y
±
- O^PX, where
(* " 8 Z )P
8
X
5 a + 3be *
The capitalist-entrepreneurs are making the internal rate of
return \ on the money value of the capital stock they own, i. e., all
capital stock minus the wage earners* investment fund. The internal
rate of return i includes profits and capital gains, as we shall see in
Eq. (57) in Sec. V. Follow convention and exclude capital gains from
disposable income. According to (20) profits are earned at the rate k,
so define disposable income of the capitalist-entrepreneurs as
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their profits on all capital stock minus the fund minus their
contribution to the fund
Y. = K(PS - *) - bZ
Remembering the two separate forms of C29), insert (20) and (29)
and write the disposable income of the capitalist-entrepreneurs
(31) Y
2
- 9
2
PX, where
(l - 8Z )P
9
2
3 6 - gb - $bK[ e L - l]/(i - gz ) for \ + g.
9
2
= B - 6b - 8b<p for l - g z
Add (30) and (31) and find national disposable money income
(32) I 2 Yj + Y
2
9PX, where
(t - g 7 )P
6 = 8
X
+ 8
2
- 1 + Bb(i - g
z
- K)[e z - l]/(i - g ) for x + g.
e = e
1
+ e
2
- 1 - Bb<p for i - g
8 is a disposable-income to output ratio, a "payout" ratio.
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5. Consumption
Let the parameter c. be the propensity to consume national
disposable real income:
(33) C s cdY/P
Define the variable c as the propensity to consume national
output
:
(34) C £ cX
Take (32), (33), and (3H) together and find
(35) c « cde
Define the variable v as the propensity to save national
output
(36) V S 1 - c
6. Equilibrium
Finally, output equilibrium requires output to equal the sum
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of consumption and investment demand for it:
(37) X = C I
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR PROPORTIONATE RATES OF GROWTH
Define, as Hahn and Matthews [3] did, steady-state growth as
stationary proportionate rates of growth. Our system (1) through
(37) possesses the following set of steady-state solutions:
(38) g s o
(39)
(40)
(41)
(42)
<43)
gC * giK
g
«
gW
I gx
g l
mm
s* s
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(•*«) gL " gF
(**5) gp
s gw - gM/a
<*6) gg = gF + gM/a
U7) g9 =
(48) gx - g s
(49) gY1 - gz
(50) gy2 -. g z
(51) gv £z
(52) g 2 -. gp +. gv
To convince himself that those are indeed solutions, the
reader should take derivatives with respect to time of (16)
through (37). He should then use the definitions (1) through
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(IS), insert the solutions (38) through (52), and convince himself
that each equation is satisfied. Thus our auxiliary assumptions
(27) and (28) consistent with. (42) and (52), respectively—have
paid off handsomely. But there is more to growth theory than finding
proportionate rates of growth. Our purpose was to find the effects
of a wage earners' investment fund upon the physical marginal
productivity of capital, disposable-income distribution between
labor and capital, the propensity to save national output, and the
rsal wage rate. Those effects are effects upon levels in a growing
economy. In determining such levels our solutions for proportionate
rates of growth (38) through (52) will be useful.
V. PHYSICAL MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY K AND INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN I
According to our solution (43) a physical unit of capital stock
added at time T would have the physical marginal productivity K at
any time from t * x to t s •. What sort of value marginal product-
ivity will it have? Let it be perfectly foreseen by the entrepren-
eurs that price is growing at the proportionate rate gp :
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gp(t - T)
(53) P(t) = e P(T)
But let the capitalist-entrepreneurs be purely competitive
ones, hence price is beyond their control. At tine t, value
marginal productivity is, then
3CP(t)X(t)3
s P(t)K
as(t)
As seen from the present time t, value marginal productivity at
time t is e" P(t)ic, where r is the discount rate applied by
the capitalist-entrepreneurs. Define present gross worth k at time
T of the physical unit of capital stock as the present worth of all
its future value marginal productivities:
(5«0 k(T) H /" e"r(t * T)P(t)Kdt
Let the rate of inflation be less than the discount rate:
(55) gp < r
Insert (53) into (54) and use (55) to carry out the integration.
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Since in the outcome all variables refer to the same time x, we
may purge it of T:
(56) k * P»c/(r - gp )
Define the present net worth of the physical unit of capital
stock as gross worth minus price:
n 5 {>/(r - gp ) - 13P
Define the internal rate of return \ as that value of r which
makes net worth equal to zero, hence
(57) l 5 K gp
where gp stands for (45). In an inflationary economy, then, the
internal rate o.f return of a physical unit of capital stock equals
the physical marginal productivity of that unit plus the proportion-
ate rate of capital gain (US).
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VI. A TRANSCENDENTAL EQUATION IN PHYSICAL MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY IC
Use (3»0, (36), and (37) to find I = VX and (1) through (16) to
find that I »' ggS, hence S = vX/g
s
« Insert that into (19) and find
(58) IC » &gc/V
Insert (45), C*6), C52), and C57) into l - gz and find
(59) 1 - g
z
« k - g g
Remembering the two separate forms of (32), insert (32), (35),
(36), and (59) into (58) and find the transcendental equation in k:
(k - g«)P
(60) k{(1 - cd )/g g + Bbc d Ee
S
- l]/(ic - gg)} - 3 for l * g z
k{(1 - c
d )/g g + Bbc d p} « $ for l - g z
An explicit solution of (60) is beyond reach. But our appendix
proves the existence of a unique and positive solution fop K. And
once wc had empirical values of the parameters entering (60) we could
find that solution numerically. Let us choose such values, then.
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VII. STYLIZED EMPIRICAL VALUES OF PARAMETERS
For Northwestern European economies let us adopt
a w 3/4
B - 1/4
c
d
m 7/8
6F
*M
m
3/100
Practical profit-sharing schemes may exempt proprietorships,
other noncorporations, small corporations, interest on liabilities,
or even interest on equity. Using £ 1/4 will therefore overstate the
volume of contributions resulting from a given contribution fraction
b. From (46) it follows that
g
s
- 1/25
VIII. NUMERICAL SOLUTIONS FOR LEVELS
1. The Physical Marginal Productivity of Capital
Insert our stylized empirical parameter values into our
transcendental equation (60) and find
(k - 0.04)p
(61) icClOO + 7b[e - 1]/(k - 0.04)} -8-0,
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Eq. (61) contains the two structural characteristics of a wage
earners' investment fund, i. e., b 5 employers' contribution as a
fraction of the profits hill and p = the redemption period. Let
us examine a rather wide range of alternative structural character-
istics of such a fund, say
h - 1/40, 1/20, 1/10, and 1/5
p - 2, 4, 8, and 16
Inserting these alternative values and using an IBM 360/75
at the University of Illinois, (61) was solved for k. The
results are shown in Column 3 of Table 1 and in Figure 1. As
one would expect, the higher the employers* contribution fraction
b and the longer the redemption period p are, the lower is the
physical marginal productivity of capital stock ic. But the
elasticities of the latter with respect to b and p apparent as
the steepness of the curves on their double-logarithmic scale—-are
modest 1& the range considered politically. Beyond h » 1/10 and
p a 8 they become noticeably higher.
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2 . Disposable-Income Distribution between Labor and Capital
Insert (59) into (30) through. (32) and write the payout ratios
(K
- g<;)P
(62) Q
±
- a + 3be a
(K - g„)p
(63) 6
2
- 6 - ah - abKfe - l]/(ic - g
g )
(k - g„)p
(64) 9 - 1 - 3bg
s
fe
S
- 1]/ (k - g
g )
Here are two opposing forces at work: Rising b or p will at
the same time make (62) rise and (63) and (64) fall (because b and
p are rising) and make (62) fall and (63) and (64) rise, because
ic is falling! But the former force wins in the practical range,
as seen from Columns H through 6 of Table 1 and from Figure 2:
The higher the employers' contribution fraction b and the longer
the redemption period p are, the higher is labor's payout ratio
and the lower is that of the capitalist-entrepreneurs. Labor wins,
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and the capitalist-entrepreneurs lose. But labor wins slightly less
than the capitalist-entrepreneurs are losing, so the overall ratio
is lower. The elasticities of the payout ratio of
capitalist-entrepreneurs with respect to b and p are considerable,
especially beyond b 1/10 and p = 8. He conclude that the
redistributive effects of a wage earners* investment fund may well
be considerable.
3. The Propensity to Save National Output
Insert (35) and (64) into (36) and write th_e propensity to save
national output
<*5) V - .1 - cd + Sbc d g s Ie - 1]/(k - g g )
Again, two opposing forces are at work: Rising b or p will at
the same time make (65) rise (because b and p are rising) and fall,
because k is falling! But the former force wins in the practical
range, as seen from Column 7 of Table 1 and from Figure 3: The
higher the employers' contribution fraction b and the longer the
redemption period p are, the higher is the propensity to save national
output. The elasticities of the latter with respect to b and p are
modest in the range considered politically. Beyond b 1/10 and
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p « 8 they become noticeably higher.
**• The Real Wage Rate
Use (34), (36), and (37) to find I s vX and (1) through (16)
to find that I = g g S, hence S = vX/gg . Insert that into (17),
insert the outcome into (18) and find the real wage rate
0-,1/ct(66) w/P c oCM(v/g
s
)
p
]
Using our empirical parameter values we find the elasticity
6/a of the real wage rate with respect to the propensity to save
national output to be 1/3 a particularly simple Tlckssll Effect*
Consequently, th.e elasticities of the real wage rate with respect
to h and p would he one-third of those of the propensity to save
national output with respect to h and p shown In Figure 3. In
other words, w/P-b and w/P-p curves would have in any point
one-third of the steepness of the corresponding point of the
corresponding curve in Figure 3.
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5. Relative Size of Fund
Insert (20) and (59) into (29) and write size of fund
(67) * $PS, where
(K - g )p
<f> 2 b«c[e - 1J/ (K - g g )
There are two opposing forces at work here: Rising b or p will
at the same time make 4> rise (because b and p are rising) and fall,
because < is falling. But the former force wins very easily in the
practical range, as seen from Column 8 of Table 1 and from Figure 4:
The higher the employers* contribution fraction b and the longer the
redemption period p are, the larger is the investment fund as a
fraction of the value of capital stock. The elasticities of the
fraction <t> with respect to b and p are considerable.
IX. PROFIT SHARING OR INVESTMENT WAGE: DOES IT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE?
From (18) and (.22) we know that W * aPX and from (20) that Z »
BPX. Whether employers contribute & fixed fraction of their wage
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bill or their profits bill, then, they will be contributing a
fixed fraction of the value of output. Consequently tbe differences
2
.
between an investment wage and profit sharing cannot be great.
Four differences, rooted inside or outside our model, do seem to
be worth mentioning.
First, under an investment wage one would define within
our model the money wage rate w as used in (18) as including
employers' contribution per man year to the wage earners* investment fund*
Only if raising w by the investment wage per man year would raise the
price of goods P in the same proportion could the real wage equal the
physical marginal productivity of labor in accordance with (18) at full
employment in accordance with (21). In this sense the investment wage
would have been shifted to the price of the product with a modification
made in Sec. VIII, 4.
No such shifting would occur under profit sharing: The capitalist
-entrepreneurs would be maximizing (1 - b)Z but within the rigid
2
In detail, the effects of an investment wage within an otherwise
similar
model have been examined in [2],
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framework of the mocletl the employment L which maximizes (1 - b)Z
is the same aa that which maximizes Z. Consequently price P would
remain unaffected by profit sharing. This difference between an
investment wage and profit sharing is rooted inside our model. The
next three differences are rooted outside it.
Second, the rigid framework of our model included the specific
provision, made in Sec. 1, that capital stock is Immortal. That
provision eliminated depreciation allowances from our model. But
in the real world, profit sharing would introduce an incentive,
absent under the investment wage, to magnify depreciation allowances
in every way possible. As we know from corporate-income-tax
practice and price-control practice there are such ways.
Third, the rigid framework of our model included the specific
provision, also made in Sec. 1, that capitalists should be stockholders
rather than bondholders. That provision eliminated bond financing
from our model. But in the real world, with profits defined to mean
profits after interest on liabilities
, profit sharing would introduce
an Incentive, also absent under the Investment wage, to substitute
bond financing for equity financing. To remove that incentive,
profits would have to be redefined to mean profits after interest
on both equity and liabilities as done by the French 1967 statute
on profit sharing.
Fourth, our solutions were steady-state ones, and others were
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ignored. The real world may be steady-state In the long run, but
in the short run it has cycles. An we know, the wage bill fluctuat-
es less over the cycle than does the profits bill. Consequently,
contributions in the form of an investment wage would fluctuate less
than would contributions in the form of profit sharing. However
similarly an investment wage and profit sharing would work in the
long run, they would thus work differently in the short run, and
the difference might be important psychologically: Under
profit sharing, labor might feel asked to participate in a risk
which would be absent from an investment wage.
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APPENDIX
THE EXISTENCE OP A UNIQUE AND POSITIVE SOLUTION OP EQUATION (60)
1. The Function (e fp - l)/f
Define f = K - gg . Then Eq. (60) has in it a function G(f) defined
G(f ) 5 (efp - l)/f for f i
0(0) = p for f =
Assume p > 0, Then 6(0) is positive. And 6(f) is positive for
f < 0, because then e p < 1, and also positive for f > 0, because then
e
fp
> 1. The limit of G(f) for f * is found by L'Hopital'e Rule:
limG(f) a p
f*0
But if G(f) nas both the value and the limit p at f a 0, it is
continuous at f « 0. The function is shown in Figure 5.
To see how 6(f) varies with f, differentiate with respect to f:
d[(e fp - l)/f] fpe fp - (efp - 1) e"*fp - (1 - fp)
(68) s 5-
df f* e~ fpf*

- 34 -
The denominator of (68) is nonnegative: It is positive for all
values of f other than f a 9 for which it is zero. The numerator is
also nonnegative. Write it u 5 e~x - (1 - x), where x £ fp. Take
the derivative du/dx = - e~x + 1, set it equal to zero* and find
x s 0. Take the second derivative d au/dx 2 s e"x > 0. Consequently
u satisfies the first-order and second-order conditions for a minir*'""
at x s 0: u is positive for all values of f other than f = 0, for
which it is zero. For f = the limit of the derivative (68) can be
found by using L'Bopital's Rule twice:
lim
dC(efp - l)/f] p*
f*0 df 2
which is positive.
2. The Brace of Eq. (60)
The brace of Eq. (60) may be written
(69) (1 - cd )/gs + 8bcdG(f)
Realistically assume that
< 6 < i
< b
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< cd
< 1
< gs
< p
Then the brace (69) is positive for all values of f • At f it
lias both the value and the limit (1 - c<j)/gs ^DC^P» hence is contin-
uous.
3. The Entire £q . (60)
But if the brace is always positive, then K times the brace is
negative, zero, and positive for k < 0, k = 0, and k > 0, respect-
ively* Moreover, since the derivative (66) has a positive limit at
k a g and is positive at all other values of k, the brace is rising
with rising tc, and K times the brace is rising in more than proportion
to K. Consequently, if we draw the left-hand side of (60) as a function
of k, the function will be continuous, will be located in the third
quadrant for < < 0, will pass through the origin for ic s 0, and will
be located in the first quadrant for tc > 0. It is rising without
bound 8 as te rises without bounds.
The right-hand side of (60) can be drawn as a horizontal line at
the positive distance from the K-axis. Curve and line must inter-
sect, will do so only once, and will do so in the first quadrant. This
proves the existence of a unique and positive solution for tc.
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FOOTNOTES
*The author is indebted, first, to Mr. Robert T. Peterson, Research
Assistant at the Statistical Services Unit of the Computer Services
Office, for having written a program solving our transcendental
equation (61). The author is indebted, second, to the Computer Service.
Office of the University of Illinois for the use of its IBM 360/75
equipment in the actual numerical solution of that equation. The
author is indebted, third, to Mr. Hideo Hashimoto, a graduate student
at the University of Illinois, for reading an earlier draft of the
manuscript and suggesting valuable improvements of it.
Profit sharing ia on the statute books of France, was proposed by labor
in the Netherlands in 1964, and is being proposed by labor in the German
Federal Republic. Alternatively, employers would contribute a fraction
of their wage bill (an investment wage) or a fraction of their equity
(equity sharing). A summary of statutes and proposals in Europe has
recently been published by The Economist Intelligence Unit [4]. The
present article confines itself to profit sharing. Elsewhere [2] the
writer has examined the investment wage.







